I speak as one who was intended by my father to be
brought up as a Rationalist. He was quite as much of a Rationalist as I am, but
he died when I was three years old, and the Court of Chancery decided that I was
to have the benefits of a Christian education.
I think perhaps the Court of Chancery might have regretted that since. It does
not seem to have done as much good as they hoped. Perhaps you may say that it
would be rather a pity if Christian education were to cease, because you would
then get no more Rationalists.
They arise chiefly out of reaction to a system of education which considers it
quite right that a father should decree that his son should be brought up as a
Muggletonian, we will say, or brought up on any other kind of nonsense, but he
must on no account be brought up to think rationally. When I was young that was
considered to be illegal.
Since I became a Rationalist I have found that there is still considerable scope
in the world for the practical importance of a rationalist outlook, not only in
matters of geology, but in all sorts of practical matters, such as divorce and
birth control, and a question which has come up quite recently, artificial
insemination, where bishops tell us that something is gravely sinful, but it is
only gravely sinful because there is some text in the Bible about it. It is not
gravely sinful because it does anybody harm, and that is not the argument. As
long as you can say, and as long as you can persuade Parliament to go on saying,
that a thing must not be done solely because there is some text in the Bible
about it, so long obviously there is great need of Rationalism in practice.
As you may know, I got into great trouble in the United States solely because,
on some practical issues, I considered that the ethical advice given in the
Bible was not conclusive, and that on some points one should act differently
from what the Bible says. On this ground it was decreed by a Law Court that I
was not a fit person to teach in any university in the United States, so that I
have some practical ground for preferring Rationalism to other outlooks.
The question of how to define Rationalism is not altogether an easy one. I do
not think that you could define it by rejection of this or that Christian dogma.
It would be perfectly possible to be a complete and absolute Rationalist in the
true sense of the term and yet accept this or that dogma.
The question is how to arrive at your opinions and not what your opinions are.
The thing in which we believe is the supremacy of reason. If reason should lead
you to orthodox conclusions, well and good; you are still a Rationalist. To my
mind the essential thing is that one should base one's arguments upon the kind
of grounds that are accepted in science, and one should not regard anything that
one accepts as quite certain, but only as probable in a greater or a less
degree. Not to be absolutely certain is, I think, one of the essential things in
rationality.
Here there comes a practical question which has often troubled me. Whenever I go
into a foreign country or a prison or any similar place they always ask me what
is my religion.
I never know whether I should say "Agnostic" or whether I should say "Atheist".
It is a very difficult question and I daresay that some of you have been
troubled by it. As a philosopher, if I were speaking to a purely philosophic
audience I should say that I ought to describe myself as an Agnostic, because I
do not think that there is a conclusive argument by which one prove that there
is not a God.
On the other hand, if I am to convey the right impression to the ordinary man in
the street I think I ought to say that I am an Atheist, because when I say that
I cannot prove that there is not a God, I ought to add equally that I cannot
prove that there are not the Homeric gods.
None of us would seriously consider the possibility that all the gods of homer
really exist, and yet if you were to set to work to give a logical demonstration
that Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, and the rest of them did not exist you would find it
an awful job. You could not get such proof.
Therefore, in regard to the Olympic gods, speaking to a purely philosophical
audience, I would say that I am an Agnostic. But speaking popularly, I think
that all of us would say in regard to those gods that we were Atheists. In
regard to the Christian God, I should, I think, take exactly the same line.
There is exactly the same degree of possibility and likelihood of the existence
of the Christian God as there is of the existence of the Homeric God. I cannot
prove that either the Christian God or the Homeric gods do not exist, but I do
not think that their existence is an alternative that is sufficiently probable
to be worth serious consideration. Therefore, I suppose that that on these
documents that they submit to me on these occasions I ought to say "Atheist",
although it has been a very difficult problem, and sometimes I have said one and
sometimes the other without any clear principle by which to go.
When one admits that nothing is certain one must, I think, also admit that some
things are much more nearly certain than others. It is much more nearly certain
that we are assembled here tonight than it is that this or that political party
is in the right. Certainly there are degrees of certainty, and one should be
very careful to emphasize that fact, because otherwise one is landed in an utter
skepticism, and complete skepticism would, of course, be totally barren and
completely useless.
On must remember that some things are very much more probable than others and
may be so probable that it is not worth while to remember in practice that they
are not wholly certain, except when it comes to questions of persecution.
If it comes to burning somebody at the stake for not believing it, then it is
worth while to remember that after all he may be right, and it is not worth
while to persecute him.
In general, if a man says, for instance, that the earth is flat, I am quite
willing that he should propagate his opinion as hard as he likes. He may, of
course, be right but I do not think he is. In practice you will, I think, do
better to assume that the earth is round, although, of course, you may be
mistaken. Therefore, I do not think we should go in for complete skepticism, but
for a doctrine of degrees of probability.
I think that, on the whole, that is the kind of doctrine that the world needs.
The world has become very full of new dogmas. The old dogmas have perhaps
decayed, but new dogmas have arisen and, on the whole, I think that a dogma is
harmful in proportion to its novelty. New dogmas are much worse than old ones.